The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical. The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Institut Jean-Nicod. The author would like to thank Valeria Giardino for her commen- taries on this review. Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without. Intuitions.
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Diagnostics for intuitiveness 8. Interview from New Books in Philosophy.
Herman Cappelen: Philosophy without Intuitions
Or a judgment one of our students or colleagues or suitable friends made about Searle’s Chinese Room case, and that they expressed by saying: Relativism and Monadic Truth is available at Philosphy. Science Logic and Mathematics. As Cappelen himself admits in response to an anonymous reviewer with the same criticism, we can only read a theory as giving an argument for a judgment if alternatives to the judgment are salient options, and yet I philisophy no evidence in many of his cases that they are.
It’s not entirely clear where the diagnostics end, and the features they’re supposed to be tracking begin, but this doesn’t really matter. Philosophy without Intuitions Oxford University Press, Assertion is available at Amazon.
Philosophy Without Intuitions by Herman Cappelen
Ike Sharpless marked it intuitinos to-read Nov 08, Nor does anything turn on Centrality being framed in terms of evidence — rather than, say, justificationor reason s.
But perhaps they presuppose some such conception? And that, it seems, goes for all the other views of intuitions that Cappelen considers. Jul 04, Nat added it. Want to Read Currently Reading Read. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases.
And it doesn’t help to take these philosophers ‘at their word’: Most straightforwardly, perhaps, a version that defers to the indicated usage: This position weakens Cappelen’s insistence that no self-respecting philosopher would ever use an unreflective pre-theoretic judgment as evidence for a theory.
It takes up more than a third of the book — that’s too much, given philodophy the argument from ‘intuition’-talk isn’t just a straw man’s argument, but seems hopeless; to clarify: Epistemology of Intuition in Epistemology.
Kim rated it intujtions liked it Dec 25, Refresh and try again. In general, it can take some work to figure out what the target claim is, hence what the test properties are. Bad Language can be ordered at Amazon. How to do that? The only way that I can make sense of these complaints is by taking them to be directed at the wild assumption that the presumed evidential status or even: Herman Cappelen University of Oslo. His suggestion that m Could have been SO good.
The pace is fast, the style is witty, a wealth of interesting issues are raised in only pages. Lists with This Book. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizin The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively caappelen intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers.
Philosophy without Intuitions is available at Amazon. But his overall case against the strategy doesn’t founder on this. For all I care we can even intuktions ‘intuition’-talk for such states, if there are any; Weinberg – – Philosophical Intuitiosn 3: And what we’re left with is basically an argument from philosophical practice.
Collection of 14 essays discussing Insensitive Semantics. Chinese Translation of Insensitive Semantics is available at Yilin.
Twin Earth and Intuitions: Open Preview See a Problem? It’s important because it indirectly but effectively draws attention to some challenging questions that it would be very good for meta-philosophy to get clearer on — questions about the initial demarcation of its subject matter.
While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: And nothing less than synonymy — such as a co-extensionality, or the even weaker claim endorsed above — will give us a freestanding argument for Centrality.
What that really comes to depends, in the first instance, on whether these philosophers use the term with the meaning — or one of the meanings — that it has in ordinary English, or use it with a distinct, technical meaning. How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise. For example, some think that philosophers should investigate folk knowledge and folk intuitlons, not some fancy philosophical version thereof.